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ABSTRACT

Three experiments examined effects of measuring self-reported emotional intensity on subsequent self-reported emotional intensity. Across 3 experiments, we induced sadness, envy,
and happiness and manipulated the number of emotional intensity measurements. In all
experiments, repeated measurement led to weaker intensity of negative emotions than did
a single measurement. Although the intensity of happiness was unaffected by repeated
measurement, data suggest that measurements interfered with ongoing emotional experience. We suggest that our findings have methodological, conceptual, and practical implications, but perhaps foremost is the warning that social scientists may have greater cause for
caution regarding repeated self-report measures than previously thought.

Psychological measurements are imperfect, and
researchers understand that measurement error is
inevitable (Cole & Preacher, 2014; Schmidt & Hunter,
1996). With this understanding, it is convenient to
assume that measurement error is an artifact of observation, but the signal or the true value of a variable
remains unaffected by the measurement process. This
assumption is widespread in psychological science (for
exceptions, see Knowles, Coker, Scott, Cook, &
Neville, 1996; Sharpe & Gilbert, 1998; Shrout et al.,
2018). If pressed, many researchers would acknowledge the possibility of measurement interference
and would perhaps cite the Hawthorne effect
(Landsberger, 1958), which describes behavioral
changes stemming from participants’ awareness that
they are being observed. However, most current
empirical work ignores the possibility that measures
might affect the psychological constructs being
observed. The goal of the current research was to
examine the effect of measurement on the psychological phenomena under investigation.
To highlight our concerns regarding psychological
measurements, let us use an example from the physical sciences in which the term observer effect is commonly used to refer to disturbances in a system due
to measurement (e.g., Buks, Schuster, Heiblum,
Mahalu, & Umansky, 1998; Riley & Steitz, 2013):
When one measures the temperature of hot water
with a glass thermometer, some heat is lost from the
water to the thermometer. As a result, temperature
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measurements are likely biased. With a large vessel
such as a barrel, the bias might be negligible because
only a tiny fraction of the water’s heat is transferred
to the thermometer. However, if one uses the same
thermometer to measure temperature in a small vessel, such as a 50-ml beaker, the heat lost to the thermometer may significantly threaten the validity of the
observation. Furthermore, subsequent measurements
of the water’s temperature will yield different results
than if the water had not been previously measured.
Thus, if one wishes to measure natural temperature
change over time, one must take into account the selfcontaminating nature of the measurement process,
whereby heat lost during each measurement could
change the temperature being measured.
Similar concerns about self-contamination may apply
to measurements of psychological phenomena such as
emotions. If, like physical heat, some amount of emotional “heat” were lost due to measurement, it could
threaten the validity of that observation and especially
any subsequent observations. Although psychologists
are already keenly aware that any psychological measure provides only an imperfect estimate of the value of
a psychological construct, we propose a potentially
more threatening possibility: that such measures might
also inadvertently change the value of the constructs
they are intended to observe. In our attempt to uncover
observer effects in psychology, we focus the present
investigation on the measurement of emotions through
self-reports. From this point forward, we use the
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truncated term repeated measurement to refer specifically to repeated measurement via self-report.
A brief overview of observer effects in
social science
As just mentioned, there exists a limited but notable
collection of past research that has examined the possibility of observer effects in psychological or behavioral
measures. The arguably best-known example of observation interfering with the psychological phenomena
being measured is the Hawthorne effect (Landsberger,
1958). Although the Hawthorne effect has received
criticism for weak evidence in the original data and
multiple researchers’ struggles to replicate findings
(Carey, 1967; Levitt & List, 2011; Miller & Form,
1951), it introduced many social and psychological scientists to the possibility of observer effects. At the very
least, psychologists have since acknowledged that measurement can create “demand characteristics,” which is
a broad term used to describe the effects of social or
procedural cues that participants may pick up on during a study and of participants’ motivations related to
being observed, including attempts to be a “good subject” (Orne, 1962; see also Adair, 1984).
Whereas the Hawthorne effect drew attention to the
effects of simply measuring a construct, the effects of
repeatedly measuring the same construct were pointed
out by research on attitudes. It has been shown that
repeated measurements or expressions of attitudes can
increase attitude accessibility (Powell & Fazio, 1984),
attitude extremity (Downing, Judd, & Brauer, 1992),
and attitude polarization (Brauer, Judd, & Gliner,
1995). Attitude accessibility was defined as the latency
of response to an attitudinal inquiry. Thus, in certain
contexts at least, researchers explicitly recognize that
psychological measurement can have effects of its own.
In a more recent and related area of investigation,
a number of independent research teams have also
found important behavioral effects of “mere measurement” (e.g., Godin, Sheeran, Conner, & Germain,
2008; Greenwald, Carnot, Beach, & Young, 1987;
Morwitz, Johnson, & Schmittlein, 1993; Sandberg &
Conner, 2009; Sherman, 1980). For example, Sherman
(1980) found that asking people to predict their future
behavior yielded behavior that was consistent with
those predictions and different from that of participants who were not asked to make predictions.
Greenwald et al. (1987) found that asking people
whether they intend to vote led to an increased likelihood of voting, which was mediated by behavioral
intentions to vote. Morwitz et al. (1993), who coined

the term mere-measurement effect, found that measuring an individual’s purchase intentions changed subsequent purchase behavior (see also Morwitz &
Fitzsimons, 2004). Similarly, Sandberg, & Conner
(2009) found that measurement of anticipated regret
led to higher cervical screening attendance rates.
In lieu of these findings, it makes sense that other
researchers have raised concerns about measurementinduced disturbances in at least two domains of
inquiry. Speaking to mediation testing, Lindsay &
Anderson (2000) rightly pointed out that measurements that interfere with subsequent measurements
violate the assumption of mediation testing. Also relevant are diary studies, which typically involve selfreport instruments administered repeatedly for the
examination of ongoing experience (Bolger, Davis, &
Rafaeli, 2003; Iida, Shrout, Laurenceau, & Bolger,
2012; Moskowitz, Russell, Sadikaj, & Sutton, 2009;
Reis & Gable, 2000; Wheeler & Reis, 1991). Recently,
Iida et al. (2012) expressed concern about the degree
to which repeated measurements in diary studies can
change participants’ experience and behavior.
Why focus on self-reported emotions?
Although our general concern applies to measurement
of a broad range of psychological phenomena, we
believe that emotion is a domain in which such concerns are especially important. Self-reports are a critically
important mainstay of the measurement toolbox used
by psychologists when studying emotions and their
causes and consequences. Specifically, emotion researchers continue to examine the relevance of emotions for
cognition, judgment, and behavior (e.g., Baumann &
DeSteno, 2010; Rusting, 1999; Van Boven, Kane,
McGraw, & Dale, 2010; White & Van Boven, 2012; see
Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011, for review). Therefore,
potential biases in self-reported emotion intensity are
relevant to a wide range of psychological research.
Moreover, the extant literature points to
unanswered questions regarding the effects of selfreport measurements of emotions. For instance,
Kassam & Mendes (2013) experimentally manipulated
self-reports of anger and shame induced in the laboratory. Half of the participants provided self-reports of
their emotional states, whereas the other half completed a control questionnaire. Effects of self-reported
emotions manifested in subsequent physiological
measures, albeit selectively. Angry participants who
reported their anger showed decreased cardiac output
and increased total peripheral resistance, relative to
those who did not. However, cardiovascular responses
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amidst shame were not affected by self-reports.
Unfortunately, the researchers did not directly examine effects on the measured construct itself.
Another example is research on affective labeling,
especially studies in which affect labeling has been
used as an emotion-regulation technique (Lieberman,
Inagaki, Tabibnia, & Crockett, 2011; Ortner, 2015;
Tabibnia, Lieberman, & Craske, 2008). In such studies, participants view a series of emotion-provoking
stimuli and choose a word to identify the feeling. In
particular, Lieberman et al. (2011) contrasted labeling
of a series of emotional pictures in the labeling condition with merely looking at the same set of pictures in
the control condition. However, it is possible that
labeling hindered the development of an emotional
response instead of regulating a full-blown response.
Given that measurements of emotions are usually not
conducted in this online fashion, we wished to more
directly assess the effect of measuring emotions than
is offered by studies on labeling.
Other researchers seem to at least implicitly
acknowledge that measurements might have undesirable effects on research participants’ subsequent emotions (e.g., Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Hunsinger,
Isbell, & Clore, 2012; Keltner, Locke, & Audrain,
1993). Dunn & Schweitzer (2005) examined the influence of incidental emotions on trust in unrelated settings. In Study 1, the researchers induced different
emotions but deliberately omitted conducting manipulation checks on their primary sample due to concerns
that a manipulation check “would reduce the effects
of our emotion induction” (p. 739). They instead
tested their manipulation on a pilot sample. Thus,
concerns about undesirable influences of measurements seem to have influenced some researchers’
methodological decisions. Yet we are unaware of any
direct investigations of the effects of self-report measurements on the psychological phenomena they are
used to measure.

Overview
The prevalence of self-report emotion measures—plus
evidence that some researchers have been concerned
about measurements’ possible unintended effects on
emotions—suggests that emotion is a natural domain
in which to look for evidence of observer effects in
psychological measurement. We were directly interested in the effect of measurement on the measured
quantity itself. Specifically, we examined the effect of
measurement of emotion intensity on emotion intensity. A direct advantage is that our data allowed us to
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test the direction of the effect, that is, whether measurements reduce emotion intensity, maintain it, or
increase it. In so doing, we expanded the range of
emotions to include negative and positive emotions to
test generalizability and/or detect boundary conditions
for observer effects in self-reported emotion. The purpose of the current investigation, however, was to
establish a reliable effect rather than to rule in a single
mechanism.
Three experiments examined emotions of different
valence (positive/negative) and nature (basic/complex)
while utilizing different emotion induction paradigms.
Experiments 1 and 2 examined negative emotions—
sadness and envy, respectively. Experiment 3 examined a positive emotion (happiness). The basic
emotions of sadness and happiness were induced
using affective story recall. The complex emotion of
envy was induced via comparisons with a high- versus
low-status peer. Despite these differences, the methodology was similar across all experiments. Each
included an emotion induction task followed by a
final self-report measurement of emotions. We manipulated the number of measurements before the final
measurement. Unrelated reading tasks were included
as fillers. In Experiment 3, we complemented final
self-reports of emotion intensity with measurements
of behavior relevant to happiness.

Hypotheses
At the core of our investigation was the idea that selfreport measurements can influence ongoing emotional
experience. Our first prediction was based on the finding that simply paying attention to emotion can lead to
a decrease in negative affect (Thompson et al., 2011).
We hypothesized that more measurements would
weaken negative emotions. We call this the “numbing
effect” and examined it in all experiments. The
hypothesized numbing effect is also consistent with the
idea of habituation in diary studies (Bolger et al., 2003).
In Experiment 3, we tested whether the patterns
observed with negative emotions would hold with a
positive emotion, namely, happiness. We considered
this study to be more exploratory due to the unclear
theoretical and empirical support regarding positive
affect. For example, although Thompson et al. (2011)
found that emotion attention reduced negative affect,
they did not find similar effects on positive affect. In
addition, opposing forces might be at play in the case
of positive emotions. For instance, people are prone
to maintaining positive emotions (Tamir, 2009;
Volokhov & Demaree, 2010). Although we might
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expect that measurements would reduce the intensity
of positive emotions, this effect might be less pronounced than the effect on negative emotions because
the motivation to maintain the positive emotions
might counter the effect of measurement. Finally, we
examined the happiness-specific task of impression
formation, with the intent of investigating the effects
of prior self-report measures on measures other than
self-reports of emotion.

Experiment 1: Sadness
Method
Participants and design
This study comprised 198 participants (117 female)
from a large midwestern university who earned
research credit toward a course requirement as compensation for their participation. Participants were
randomly assigned to either a neutral mood induction
condition or one of the three mood (sadness) induction conditions. The three mood induction conditions
differed in the number of self-report measurements
before the final measurement (we use self-explanatory
labels to refer to these conditions, namely, six-measurement, two-measurement, and one-measurement).
Emotion intensity was measured over a 25-min period
after initial emotion induction.
Comparison of the six- and the one-measurement
conditions allowed us to examine the effect of measurements on final emotion intensity. Because we
expected no differences in the initial effects of our
mood induction, we hypothesized that at Time 1 the
six- and the two-measurement conditions would show
comparable levels of sadness. Moreover, a comparison
between the six- and the two-measurement conditions
at Time 6 allowed us to examine the effect of measurements on change in emotion intensity between initial and final assessments.
Materials and procedures
Participants completed the study online. First, participants recalled and described an experience from their
recent past. In the neutral group, this experience was
a trip to the grocery store. In the three emotion
groups, this experience was a recent episode of sadness. Participants typed descriptions of their experiences. Next, participants answered some objective
questions about their experience, for instance, “How
many months and years have passed since the occurrence of the experience you just described?” Between
emotion induction and the final measurement, participants completed five unrelated filler tasks (e.g., they

read and answered questions about articles from websites of National Geographic and the Discovery
Channel). Filler tasks were interspersed with measurements of emotional intensity contingent upon the
condition, as described next.
In the neutral-mood and the six-measurement conditions, emotion intensity was measured five times
before the final measurement. The first measurement
occurred immediately after emotion induction.
Consecutive measurements were separated by 5-min
intervals. In the two-measurement condition, emotions
were measured once right after emotion-induction and
then 25 min later. In the one-measurement condition,
emotions were measured only at the end of the
25-min interval after induction. To avoid confounding
with time, an additional 30 s were allocated for each
filler task in the case of participants who did not
receive a measurement. Thus, the conditions differed
in the number of emotion measurements after emotion induction. We denote measurements by the time
at which they occurred (e.g., Time 6 measurement).
Each measurement of sadness employed the
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule–Expanded
Form (Watson & Clark, 1994). On a scale of 1 (not at
all) to 5 (strongly), participants rated the extent to
which they felt sad, blue, downhearted, alone, and
lonely. Responses were aggregated to compute a sadness score. Participants also completed the Alertness,
Shyness, and Fatigue subscales to minimize transparency and demand characteristics, resulting in
17 items.
Results
Means and standard deviations of sadness have been
reported in Table 1. First, we examined the manipulation of sadness via the affective recall task. Sadness
scores at Time 1 (a = 0.92) were submitted to a oneway analysis of variance (ANOVA; g2 = 0.07).
Planned contrasts revealed that Time 1 sadness in the
six- and the two-measurement conditions taken
together (M = 2.30, SD = 1.09) was stronger than in
the neutral mood condition (M = 1.70, SD = .89; d =
0.60). Time 1 sadness in the six-measurement condition (M = 2.20, SD = 0.93) was fairly similar to the
two-measurement condition (M = 2.39, SD = 1.18; d
= !0.18). Second, we examined the effect of measurement on sadness at Time 6. Sadness scores at Time 6
(a = 0.92) were submitted to a one-way ANOVA.
Planned contrasts revealed that Time 6 sadness in the
six-measurement condition (M = 1.48, SD = 0.72) was
weaker than in the two- and the one-measurement
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Table 1. Mean emotion intensity of induced emotion.
Experiment
1

2
3

Emotion induction

No. of measurements

Sadness
Sadness
Sadness
Neutral
Envy
Envy
Neutral
Happiness
Happiness

6
2
1
6
6
1
6
4
1

Time 1
2.20
2.39
—
1.70
4.78
—
1.40
7.00
—

(0.93)
(1.18)
(0.89)
(2.54)
(0.80)
(2.26)

Time 2
1.68
—
—
1.58
3.68
—
1.48
5.92
—

(0.72)
(0.82)
(2.66)
(1.07)
(1.96)

Time 3
1.63
—
—
1.51
3.50
—
1.34
5.55
—

(0.79)
(0.71)
(2.88)
(0.96)
(2.21)

Time 4
1.49
—
—
1.48
3.39
—
1.30
4.94
4.83

(0.64)
(0.67)
(2.97)
(0.82)
(1.93)
(1.61)

Time 5
1.55
—
—
1.45
3.09
—
1.36
—
—

(0.80)
(0.66)
(2.80)
(0.97)

Time 6
1.48
1.94
1.82
1.42
3.03
4.62
1.28
—
—

(0.74)
(1.14)
(0.83)
(0.62)
(2.72)
(2.80)
(0.72)

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses.

conditions taken together (M = 1.85, SD = 0.98; d =
0.43, g2 = 0.04). Thus, as hypothesized, sadness was
weaker after the same time delay postinduction if it
had been measured multiple times rather than only
once or twice.
In addition to reported intensity, we also examined
the decline in sadness by computing the difference in
sadness between Time 1 and Time 6. Note that this
was possible only for conditions in which sadness was
measured prior to Time 6. Overall, sadness in the sixmeasurement condition decreased from Time 1 (M =
2.20, SD = 0.93) to Time 6 (M = 1.48, SD = 0.72; d =
0.86). The decrease in the six-measurement condition
(M = 0.76, SD = 0.89) was larger relative to the twomeasurement condition (M = 0.40, SD = 0.64; d =
0.46). Thus, over the same period, sadness declined at
a faster rate when more measurements were administered. Next, we examined the decrease in sadness
between Time 1 and Time 2. In the six-measurement
condition, the decrease between Time 1 and Time 2
(M = 0.52, SD = 0.71) was only moderately smaller
than the overall decrease between Time 1 and Time 6
(M = 0.76, SD = 0.89; d = 0.29) and not substantially
different from the overall decrease in the two-measurement condition between Time 1 and Time 6 (M =
0.40, SD = 0.64; d = 0.18). This suggests that one
prior measurement might be sufficient to bring about
a noticeable effect of measurement on emotions.

Experiment 2: Envy
Although the findings of Experiment 1 supported our
hypothesis regarding the effect of measurements on
emotion intensity, we wanted to rule out some alternate explanations. Given high face-validity of
Experiment 1, it is possible that participants tried to
make sense of the frequent measurements in the context of the induced emotion of sadness. For instance,
participants might have reported weaker emotions in
subsequent measurements in attempts to be consistent
with lay understanding about emotions (e.g., emotions
become weaker over time). Therefore, in Experiment

2, we used a cover story to draw attention away from
the purpose of the study and thus minimize the
potential role of demand characteristics.
Furthermore, memory biases and the personal relevance of the recalled sadness episodes in Experiment
1 could have driven the effect of measurements on
subsequent emotion. We address these concerns in
the Experiment 2 via a different approach to emotion
induction. We induced emotion directly in the lab
instead of relying on affective recall. Finally,
Experiment 2 focused on a different, more complex
negative emotion (envy) to broaden the generalizability of our investigation.
Method
Participants and design
This study comprised 137 participants (49 female)
from a large midwestern university who earned
research credit toward a course requirement as compensation for their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to either a neutral-emotion condition
or one of two emotion (envy) conditions. The emotion
conditions differed in the number of measurements
administered prior to the final measurement of emotional intensity. We use self-explanatory labels to refer
to these conditions, namely, six-measurement and onemeasurement. Emotion intensity was measured over a
25-min period after initial emotion induction.
Materials and procedures
Upon participants’ arrival at the laboratory, the
experimenter introduced the study as examining “how
perceptions and feelings toward the content of news
stories may change based on how the information is
presented.” Furthermore, participants were told that
one interest was to simulate the process of taking
breaks while receiving information online. Participants
were told that although people in the study would
receive information across many different media, they
would read an article from the university newspaper
followed by articles from “international websites”
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(which served as filler tasks). Participants were seated
at a computer on which the first article appeared. The
online version of the article was developed in collaboration with the university newspaper, thus rendering
it indistinguishable from any “real” article that the
students would normally encounter.
This first article was ostensibly from a series of
interviews profiling individual students on campus.
The fictional individual in the article was of the same
gender as the participant. In the neutral-emotion condition, the content of the article left an impression that
the individual was average (an average-looking, mediocre student with some financial struggles and an
unexceptional social life). In the two envy conditions
(six- and one-measurement), the individual was superior (a physically attractive, excellent student with upper
middle-class parents and an exciting social life).
Between emotion induction and the final measurement,
participants completed five unrelated filler tasks as in
Experiment 1. Filler tasks were interspersed
with measurements of emotional intensity contingent
upon the condition. In the neutral-mood and six-measurement conditions, emotion intensity was measured
five times before the final measurement. The first
measurement occurred immediately after induction.
Consecutive measurements were separated by 5-min
intervals. In the one-measurement condition, emotions
were only measured at the end of the 25-min interval
after induction. To avoid confounding with time, additional 30 s were allocated for each filler task in the
case of participants who did not receive a measurement. Comparison of the final emotion intensity in the
six- and the one-measurement conditions allowed us to
examine the effect of measurements on emotions.
Each measurement of emotions was administered covertly. Participants were instructed that “comprehension
may be influenced by feelings” and that it was important
to measure how they felt toward the individual in the
article. Following these instructions, participants were
asked to rate their feelings on 32 emotional reactions
(see Krizan & Johar, 2012). This presentation was
designed to decrease the likelihood that participants
would guess that assessing envy (or any other specific
emotion) was central to the study goals. We created an
Envy index based on the responses to envious of, jealous
of, and resentful envy toward. A scale of 0 (not at all) to
10 (a great amount) was used for responses.
Results
Means and standard deviations of envy have been
reported in Table 1. First, we examined the

manipulation of envy via the newspaper article task.
Time 1 envy (a = 0.87) in the neutral condition (M =
1.40, SD = 0.80) was weaker than Time 1 envy in the
six-measurement condition (M = 4.78, SD = 2.54),
confirming that we successfully manipulated envy (d
= 1.79). Second, we examined the effect of measurement on envy at Time 6. Time 6 envy scores (a =
0.90) were submitted to a one-way ANOVA (g2 =
0.07). Time 6 envy in the six-measurement condition
(M = 3.03, SD = 2.72) was weaker than Time 6 envy
in the one-measurement condition (M = 4.62, SD =
2.80; d = 0.57). Thus, consistent with our hypothesis
and the results of Experiment 1, envy was lower due
to more measurements of the emotion. Figure 2
presents the emotion-measurements across time in
different groups. Note that Time 1 envy in the sixmeasurement condition is comparable to the Time 6
envy in the one-measurement condition.
Next, we more closely examined the decrease in
envy. First, there was a sizeable overall decrease in
envy in the six-measurement condition between Time
1 (M = 4.78, SD = 2.54) and Time 6 (M = 3.03, SD =
2.72; d = 0.66). Second, in the six-measurement condition, this decrease between Time 1 and Time 6 (M =
1.93, SD = 2.08) was moderately greater than the
decrease between Time 1 and Time 2 (M = .96, SD =
1.86; d = 0.49). Therefore, later measurements after
the first one continued to decrease the intensity of
envy. Third, Time 2 envy in the six-measurement
condition (M = 3.68, SD = 2.66) was smaller than
Time 6 envy in the one-measurement condition (M =
4.62, SD = 2.80; d = 0.34). Consistent with the findings of Experiment 1, it seems that one prior measurement might be sufficient to bring about a
noticeable effect of measurement on emotions.
Discussion
An intriguing finding was that Time 6 envy in the
one-measurement condition was comparable to Time
1 envy in the six-measurement condition. It seems to
suggest that the absence of measurements may have
served to “preserve” emotional intensity at its initial
level. However, there could be another possibility. The
purpose of the cover story was to divert focus away
from the purpose of the study. In doing so, the cover
story could have prevented a thorough evaluation
of the envy-provoking stimuli (in terms of the highstatus social comparison target). As such, participants
might not have fully experienced envy until the first
measurement forced them to think about it. Hence,
when participants in the no-measurement condition
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reported their emotions for the first time, at Time 6,
their psychological experience (not just emotion intensity as measured) was comparable to Time 1 envy in
the five-measurement condition. Regardless of which
of these competing explanations is true, these findings
nevertheless support our hypothesis that measurements of emotions can have a systematic effect on the
ongoing emotional experience.

Experiment 3: Happiness
Experiment 3 extended the findings of the first two
experiments in multiple ways. First, we examined the
positive emotion of happiness in addition to negative
emotions. We hoped to test generalizability of the
findings so far. As discussed earlier, we expected that
negative emotions would be more strongly affected by
repeated measurements owing to the motivation to
maintain positive emotions (Tamir, 2009). Second,
similar to Hunsinger et al. (2012), we measured individual (dispositional) differences in attention to emotion to more closely examine the effect of repeated
measurements.
We assume that repeated measurements draw
attention to emotion and that this enhanced attentional focus would carry over to subsequent tasks, as
shown by prior research (e.g., Forster, Friedman, &
Liberman, 2004; Trope & Liberman, 2003; Wakslak,
Trope, Liberman, & Alony, 2006; see Forster &
Dannenberg, 2010). Furthermore, happiness has been
found to promote the use of accessible cognitive
responses (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007). Therefore, we
expected to observe the effects of enhanced attention
in downstream processes. However, the increase in
attentional focus (owing to measurement) should be
stronger in people who score low on baseline attention to emotion. Thus, we hypothesized that individual differences in attention to emotion should
moderate the effect of measurement.
We were also concerned that altered reports of
emotion intensity may or may not necessarily denote
an actual change in the underlying emotional experience. To more closely examine the underlying emotional experience, we complemented the self-report
measures with an indirect measure of emotion in
Experiment 3. However, we do not wish to imply that
indirect measures necessarily offer greater validity
while measuring cognitive processes (Gawronski &
Hahn, in press).
For the indirect measure, we chose to examine
mood effects on stereotyping because of the preponderance of evidence for such effects (Bless, 2000;
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Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Susser, 1994; Isbell, 2004).
For example, Hunsinger et al. (2012) had participants
complete an impression formation task that included
both categorical (e.g., trait labels) and behavioral
information about a target individual. When participants were led to focus on their immediate psychological state (i.e., current affective experience), happy
moods led to judgments reflecting behavior-level
information. We expected similar results in our
Experiment 3.
We maintain that repeated measurements tend to
draw attention toward the emotional experience of an
individual. In an impression formation task, repeated
measurements should nudge individuals away from
relying on categorical information and more toward
behavioral-level information. We hypothesized that
repeated measurement of emotion would thus reduce
stereotype-consistent impression formation. Again, we
expected that individual (dispositional) differences in
attention to emotion would moderate the effect of
repeated measurements.
Method
Participants and design
The study comprised 215 participants (116 female)
from a medium-size midwestern university who
earned research credit toward a course requirement as
compensation for their participation. The affective
story recall paradigm used in Experiment 1 was used
to induce happiness in all participants. Note that we
measured sadness in this experiment but did not
induce it. In the first two experiments, emotion intensity stabilized by the fourth assessment. Therefore, to
streamline our method, participants in Experiment 3
were randomly assigned to either a one-measurement
or a four-measurement condition. Emotion intensity
in both conditions was thus measured over a corresponding 15-min period after initial emotion induction. Comparison of groups allowed us to examine the
effect of measurements on final emotion intensity and
on the impression formation task.
Materials and procedures
The order in which emotion induction, measurements,
and filler tasks appeared was similar to that in
Experiment 1. In the four-measurement condition,
emotion intensity was measured at approximately 0, 5,
and 10 min after emotion induction, and again at the
conclusion of 15 min. In the one-measurement condition, emotions were measured only at the conclusion
of 15 min. To avoid confounding with time, an
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additional 30 s were allocated for each filler task in
the case of participants who did not receive a measurement. Prior to the final measurement, all participants completed an impression formation task. It was
critical to administer the impression formation task
before the final measurement. We anticipated that the
final measurement would increase attention to emotions even in the one-measurement group, thereby
making it harder to observe the effect of attention in
the impression formation task.
Happiness measurements employed the Joviality subscale of the Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule–Expanded Form (Watson & Clark, 1994). On
a scale of 0 (not at all) to 10 (a great amount), participants rated the extent to which they felt happy, joyful,
delighted, cheerful, excited, enthusiastic, lively, and energetic. Responses were aggregated to compute a happiness score. Participants also completed the Sadness and
Alertness subscales described in Experiment 1.
Finally, participants completed the emotionattention measure adapted by Hunsinger et al. (2012).
This measure includes items from the Emotional
Creativity Scale (Averill, 1999) and the Meta-Mood
Scale (Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai,
1995). Three items each were taken from Emotional
Creativity Scale (e.g., “I think about and try to understand my emotional reactions”) and the Meta-Mood
Scale (e.g., “I often think about my feelings”). We
used an 11-point scale from 0 (none at all) to
10 (a great amount; a = 0.84).
Impression Formation Task. Participants read a
story about an individual described as highly extroverted (Hunsinger et al., 2012). The story presented a
list of behaviors, only half of which were consistent
with the category label (i.e., stereotype of an extroverted individual). After reading the story, participants
rated the extent to which different stereotype-relevant
terms described the target individual on a scale from
0 (none at all) to 10 (a great amount). Impressions of
extroversion were computed as the aggregate of
responses to withdrawn, shy, a loner, quiet, talkative,
self-confident, sociable, and outgoing. The first four
items were reverse-coded (a = 0.76). Participants also
reported how carefully they read the story, on the
same 0–10 scale.
Results
Carefulness. Carefulness scores were fairly similar in
the repeated measurements condition (M = 7.70, SD =
1.40) and the single measurement condition (M =
7.50, SD = 1.30), d = 0.15.

Self-reported emotion. Sadness at Time 4 (a = 0.89)
in the four-measurement group (M = 2.59, SD = 1.64)
was lower than sadness in the one-measurement
group (M = 3.15, SD = 1.70; d = 0.34). To examine
the effects of our manipulation and dispositional emotion-attention, ratings of sadness at Time 4 were submitted to a hierarchical regression with the condition,
emotion-attention, and their product as predictors.
We observed a main effect of condition (b = !0.35,
g2 = 0.03) and an interaction effect (b = 0.18, g2 =
0.01) but no main effect of emotion-attention (g2 <
0.01). Those low on emotion-attention (!1 SD)
showed much lower sadness scores as a result of
repeated measurement (simple slope test: b = !0.53).
Those high on this dimension were not affected by
repeated measurement as strongly (simple slope test:
b = !.17). Thus, relative to those who scored high on
emotion-attention, those who scored low on emotionattention showed a stronger reduction in sadness,
owing to repeated measurements. Overall, sadness in
the four-measurement condition declined from Time
1 (M = 3.71, SD = 2.36) to Time 6 (M = 2.59, SD =
1.64; d = 0.40).
In contrast to findings involving sadness, happiness
at Time 4 (a = 0.96) in the four-measurement group
(M = 4.94, SD = 1.93) was almost identical to happiness in the one-measurement group (M = 4.83, SD =
1.64; d = 0.06; see Figure 3). To examine the effect of
our manipulation and dispositional emotion-attention,
ratings of happiness at Time 4 were submitted to hierarchical regression with the condition, emotion-attention, and their product as predictors. There were no
main effects of measurement or emotion-attention (g2
< 0.01). However, an interaction was observed (b =
0.24, g2 = 0.02). Those low on emotion-attention (!1
SD) showed lower happiness scores as a result of
repeated measurement (simple slope test: b = !0.19).
However, those high on this dimension showed higher
happiness scores as a result of measurement (simple
slope test: b = 0.31). Thus, data suggest, albeit weakly,
that the manipulation of measurements lowered happiness for those who scored low on emotion-attention,
relative to those scoring high on emotion-attention.
Impression-formation task. To examine the effect
of our manipulation and dispositional emotionattention on the likelihood of stereotype-consistent
impression formation, impressions of extraversion
were submitted to hierarchical regression with the
condition, emotion-attention, and their product as
predictors. The carefulness score was used as a covariate. There were no main effects of measurement or
emotion-attention (g2 < 0.01). As expected, emotion-
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attention interacted with the measurement manipulation to shape impressions of extraversion (b = 0.32, g2
= 0.03). Specifically, emotion-attention moderated the
effect of the measurement manipulation on impression-formation (Aiken & West, 1991). Those low on
emotion-attention (!1 SD) showed weaker impressions of extroversion as a result of repeated measurement (simple slope test: b = !0.47). However, those
high on this dimension were not particularly affected
(simple slope test: b = 0.17). As mentioned earlier, the
carefulness item was fairly similar across the two levels of condition. Moreover, the interaction effect was
still observed even when carefulness was not included
as a covariate (b = 0.24, g2 = 0.02).
Next, we more closely examined the decrease in
happiness. First, happiness in the four-measurement
condition showed a sizeable decline from Time 1 (M
= 7.00, SD = 2.26) to Time 6 (M = 4.94, SD = 1.93; d
= 0.98). Second, in the four-measurement condition,
happiness at Time 1 (M = 7.00, SD = 2.26) was moderately greater than Time 2 (M = 5.92, SD = 1.96; d =
0.51). Therefore, roughly half of the decline in happiness was observed by Time 2. Consistent with the
findings of Experiments 1 and 2, it seems that one
prior measurement might be sufficient to bring about
a noticeable effect of measurement on emotions.
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behavioral-level processing. However, people who
exhibit already-high trait scores on attention to emotion should thus be relatively unaffected on this
dimension. It thus makes sense that participants in
Experiment 3 who reported high trait scores of attention to emotion did not demonstrate higher behaviorlevel (or lower categorical-level) processing as a result
of more measurements. In contrast, participants with
low trait attention to emotion showed greater behavioral-level processing (and lesser category-level processing) as a result of more measurements. We thus
infer that measurements interfere with ongoing emotional experience by priming more attentive and
reflective cognitive styles, but only among individuals
who are not already highly attentive to their emotional experience.
A closer examination of the rate of decay of different emotions suggests an interesting possibility. We
calculated effect sizes for the change in emotion intensity between the first and the final measurements
across Experiments 1, 2, and 3. We found moderate
to strong effect sizes: Cohen’s ds were 0.86 (sadness in
Experiment 1), 0.66 (envy in Experiment 2), 0.98
(happiness in Experiment 3), and 0.4 (sadness in
Experiment 3). Given that happiness declined at a
faster rate, it is plausible that it was too late to detect
the effect of measurement by Time 4.

Discussion
Participants reported both sadness and happiness.
Although Experiment 3 strongly replicated the findings of Experiments 1 and 2 with regard to sadness,
repeated measurement was not found to influence
happiness overall. This suggests an interesting and
important potential boundary condition (see also
Thompson et al., 2011). Notably, we did observe weak
evidence for the moderating role of attention to emotions. Participants scoring low on attention to emotion were more likely to demonstrate reduced
happiness (and sadness) owing to repeated
measurement.
Furthermore, the impression formation task helped
to advance our understanding of how measurements
affect ongoing emotional experience. Although we did
not observe a main effect of our manipulation on
impression-formation, the manipulation interacted
with attention to emotion. The degree to which people
naturally adopt behavioral-level processing is partially
dependent upon their attention to their affect-eliciting
experiences (Hunsinger et al., 2012). Assuming that
self-report measurement of emotion increases attention to emotion, it should also lead to greater

General discussion
Psychology’s status as a scientific field is sometimes
criticized because psychological phenomena are difficult if not impossible to perfectly measure. Although
psychological researchers themselves understand that
measurements are fallible (Cole & Preacher, 2014;
Schmidt & Hunter, 1996), there is a dearth of direct
evidence regarding measurement-induced perturbations. Thus, the field has a surprisingly limited understanding of the ways in which measurements can
affect the phenomenon being studied (but see
Knowles et al., 1996; Sharpe & Gilbert, 1998; Shrout
et al., 2018). Furthermore, what prior evidence exists
seems to have had little cautionary effect, because, as
mentioned previously, self-reported emotions remain
widely used (and sometimes with multiple measurements) with little apparent concern about potential
self-contamination. Although we hope that it is not
the case, it is nonetheless possible that our findings
threaten the validity of a large swath of research using
such methods.
With such concerns in mind, the objective of the
current research was to better understand ways in
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which psychological measures limit empirical conclusions. We focused on self-reports partly because of
their widespread use and importance to psychological
research, despite their well-documented limitations
(e.g., Donaldson & Grant-Vallone, 2002; Nisbett &
Wilson, 1977; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, &
Podsakoff, 2003; Spector, 1994), but also because of
their inherent tendency to increase individuals’ attention to their own psychological experience.
Although psychologists acknowledge that selfreports can only help uncover processes that are
accessible to conscious awareness (Nisbett & Wilson,
1977), criticism of self-report measures typically stems
from the view that biases in self-reports constitute
additive method variance (Podsakoff et al., 2003). This
might lead one to believe that self-reports merely hinder accurate measurement, but our findings suggest
that self-reports interfere on an even deeper level:
Such measures can actively alter the psychological
phenomena being observed. For instance, across all
three experiments, self-report measures of emotion
reduced the intensity of negative emotions.
Why did self-reports of emotion intensity change
emotion intensity?
As mentioned earlier, our primary goal was to examine the self-contaminating effects of measurements
given the lack of research that directly does so. Across
three studies, we found that repeated measurements
tend to weaken the intensity of negative emotions but
not positive emotions. Experiment 3 hinted at the role
of moderator of this effect. However, adequately
uncovering the underlying mechanisms was beyond
the scope of this investigation. In the absence of additional data, we offer speculations about potential
underlying pathways that may have driven the selfcontaminating nature of measurements.
First, simply paying attention to emotions may
systematically alter them, contingent upon valence.
Thompson et al. (2011) showed that attention to emotion predicted a decrease in negative affect but did
not change positive affect. Given that attention may
open the door to regulation of emotion, the motivation to regulate or maintain certain emotions might
also play a role. In general, people are prone to regulating negative emotions while maintaining positive
emotions (Volokhov & Demaree, 2010). This might
explain why we found stronger reduction in negative
(vs. positive) emotions due to repeated measurements.
Second, self-report measurements of emotion could
facilitate repetitive thinking and influence the

emotional state, contingent upon how people think
about their emotions (Watkins, 2008). Reappraisal
might serve to regulate the emotion, thus accelerating
the decline of emotional intensity (Kalokerinos,
Greenaway, & Denson, 2015; Ray, McRae, Ochsner, &
Gross, 2010; Urry, 2009; Webb, Miles, & Sheeran,
2012). On the other hand, research on rumination
suggests that repetitive thinking stemming from measurement could serve to maintain the emotion (NolenHoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993; Ray,
Wilhelm, & Gross, 2008; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999;
Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). There are, therefore, competing arguments for how repetitive thinking from
self-reported affect might influence emotion intensity.
Regardless, the present data did not show maintenance of emotion by virtue of rumination.
Third, appraisal theories suggest that novelty of
emotional stimuli is important for a strong emotional
response. Self-report measurements may have reduced
novelty via habituation owing to increased exposure
to emotional stimuli. Consequently, emotional stimuli
might elicit only weaker emotional reactions (Scherer,
Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). Fourth, it is also possible
that the observed effects emanated from demand characteristics as suggested by the findings of Shrout et al.
(2018). When participants made their first rating, they
likely compared their current feeling to the time
before the emotion was induced. Thus, they reported
relatively strong emotions. By the second measurement, part of that evaluation may have been relative
to the previous measurement. They may have provided a weaker rating because they did not feel worse
than the previous measurement. In a similar vein, it is
also plausible that participants became less invested in
the study with each additional measurement. This
might also explain the reduction of emotion intensity
owing to measurement. However, this reasoning is
not supported by Study 3, where the effect of the
manipulation was not identical across PA and NA.
Implications
We suggest that repeated measurement of emotional
intensity is a worthy area of future study as an emotion-regulation strategy. Measurement of negative
emotions may facilitate regulation in a manner similar
to labeling affective experiences and writing about
emotions. Compared to these emotion-regulation
interventions, self-report of emotion intensity can be
utilized as a less obvious (i.e., face-valid) tool that is
less likely to elicit psychological reactance (Brehm,
1966) and is quick to administer. Writing about emotions is, comparatively, a more resource-intense
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strategy. Given the simplicity of repeated measurements of emotion, they could be a component worth
adding to interventions that do not already incorporate repeated measurements.
While adding to the literature on methodological
concerns about reliance upon self-reports, our findings pose a word of caution for researchers. By no
means do we condemn the use of self-reports in the
emotion literature. However, we urge fellow researchers to exercise caution and be mindful of the potential
effects that measurement can have on the underlying
construct in at least three contexts. First, researchers
relying on mediation testing should take note. Across
all experiments, we found a sizeable change in emotions after the first measurement. Thus, the measurement of a potential mediator, even once, could render
the mediator weaker or stronger owing to measurement. This has serious implications for observed relations between the independent variable, the mediator,
and the dependent variable. Thus, our findings add to
the available criticisms of mediation testing (Grice,
Cohn, Ramsey, & Chaney, 2015; Kline, 2015; Lindsay
& Anderson, 2000; Tate, 2015; Thoemmes, 2015).
Second, our findings suggest why the use of
manipulation checks might be a bad idea. Similar to
mediation testing, measurement intended to perform
a manipulation check could perturb the underlying
psychological experience, thereby compromising the
effect on the main dependent variable. Consistent
with previous research, our findings recommend a
careful analysis of the benefits vs. costs of using
manipulation checks (Kidd, 1976; Sawyer, Lynch, &
Brinberg, 1995; Trafimow & Rice, 2009).
Third, researchers interested in the time course of
emotions and those who rely on diary studies and
survival analysis should also take note. However, such
studies often involve longer intervals of time between
consecutive measurements (longer than 5 min). As
such, we are able to offer only broad suggestions without more research on the generalizability of our findings to diary studies.
The findings of Experiment 3 also point toward a
potential moderator of the effect that emotions have
on stereotyping. Previous research has found that incidental emotions can be important for stereotyping
of certain groups (Bodenhausen, Mussweiler, Gabriel,
& Moreno, 2001; Dasgupta, DeSteno, Williams, &
Hunsinger, 2009; Huntsinger, Sinclair, Dunn, & Clore,
2010). The impression formation task used in
Experiment 3 revealed that attention to emotion
shapes the degree to which impressions are stereotype
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consistent or inconsistent. Thus, our findings add to
the literature at the interface of incidental emotions
and stereotypes or prejudice (Hunsinger et al., 2012;
Huntsinger et al., 2010).
Our research also has implications for real-world
contexts in which people are often repeatedly asked to
report their feelings, such as in areas of patient or
customer satisfaction and loyalty. For example,
research has shown that when they take the opportunity to complain, dissatisfied customers may become
more satisfied (Nyer, 2000) and/or exhibit an increase
in loyalty (Umashankar, Ward, & Dahl, 2017).
Although there are surely multiple factors contributing to these effects, our data suggest that asking individuals who have negative feelings about a patient or
customer experience to report their emotions may
reduce those emotional aspects of dissatisfaction.
Future research could therefore investigate behavioral
consequences of repeated measurement in consumer
contexts, such as whether people are more likely to
return to a business or care provider with which they
have had a dissatisfying experience if they are first
asked to report their negative emotions regarding the
experience at least once, if not multiple times.
Future directions
Our investigation provides a first step toward understanding the effect of measurements on measured psychological phenomena such as emotions. Our hope is
that this investigation spawns a broad collection of
follow-up investigations to more completely understand the psychological experience of various types of
measurements. It is possible, if not likely, that the
self-contaminating effects observed in the present
experiments are observable in other domains beyond
emotion (such as motivation or attitudes) and, perhaps, to measurements beyond direct self-report. We
also understand that many readers may desire that
future investigations pursue direct evidence for the
specific mechanism(s) that may underlie the present
phenomenon. Although we do not discourage such
investigations, we agree with Trafimow (2012) that
the pursuit of explanatory mechanisms for their own
sake may distract scientific scholars from more
important goals such as the development of unifying
theories. In our case, we are most interested in the
phenomenon itself because of its cautionary value to
researchers who use self-reports of measurements. To
this end, the search for mechanisms may yield interesting and valuable new insights, but exploration into
a broader range of domains and measurement may be
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Figure 1. Intensity of sadness across experimental groups at
different time points. Note. Dashed error bars denote 95% confidence intervals around the mean. Means in the same condition are connected by solid lines.

more important both theoretically (in terms of offering guidance toward unification) and methodologically
(in terms of offering prescriptions for better measurement practices).
More specific to our experiments, we knowingly
confounded the number of measurements (i.e., how
many measurements took place total) with the frequency of measurements (i.e., the temporal proximity
of measurements to induction and to one another) to
keep the temporal distance between emotion induction and final measurement constant. However, as a
result of this methodological decision, it remains
unclear whether the observed effects of measurements
on emotion resulted from the numerousness or the
frequency of measurements. Although our current
conceptualization of the process at play favors numerousness over frequency, it may be that both numerousness and frequency play a role. For example, the
influence of multiple measurements might be diminished if these measurements are spread too far apart
in time. Our data shed some light in this domain. As
per Figures 1–3, the biggest decreases in emotion
intensity were observed between Time 1 and Time 2.
Also, in our experiments, we adopted a restricted
approach to emotions by focusing solely on emotional
intensity, which is a simplistic indicator of emotional
experience. In addition, duration and frequency are
also characteristic of the ongoing experience of emotions (Verduyn & Brans, 2012). The field would benefit from understanding how measurements affect these
other aspects of emotions. For instance, would negative emotions would run a shorter course owing to
being measured, or would they occur less frequently?
Conclusion
There is broad consensus that psychological measurements are not perfect. Commonly understood

Figure 2. Intensity of envy across experimental groups at different time points. Note. Dashed error bars denote 95% confidence intervals around the mean. Means in the same condition
are connected by solid lines.

Figure 3. Intensity of sadness and happiness across experimental groups at different time points. Note. Dashed error
bars denote 95% confidence intervals around the mean.

limitations of measurements are biases in memory and
self-awareness. As such, measurements are frequently
viewed as imperfect but innocent tools for capturing a
glimpse of psychological phenomena. We question this
innocence, and in a series of experiments we examined
this question empirically. In the context of self-reports
of emotional intensity, we showed that measurements
can actively interfere with the observed phenomenon,
thus not only imperfectly capturing the psychological
experience but potentially contaminating it indelibly.
Our findings offer new theoretical insights and offer a
cautionary tale to psychological scientists and others
who use self-report measures. However, at the broadest
level, we hope that these findings draw attention to the
importance of treating measurements as not merely
inert psychological instruments but as psychological
experiences in themselves.
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